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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT AND 
THE BARNETT FORMULA 
by Professor Neil Kay, Department of 
Economics, University of Strathclyde 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we shall look at the implications 
of the conventions and devices to be adopted 
for funding the Scottish parliament. It will be 
argued that there are major problems with the 
basic mechanism to be adopted (the Barnett 
formula) and that the discretionary tax raising 
powers for the Parliament may actually create 
more problems than it solves. Further, the 
Barnett formula is designed to lead to the 
eventual convergence of public spending levels 
per head in Scotland with those prevailing in 
England. Consequently, questions of whether 
or not Scotland is over-subsidised relative to 
England really miss the point since the 
practical issue is not a question of whether 
there should a reallocation of public spending 
from Scotland to England, but rather when and 
how quickly this will occur. Some economic 
and political implications of these arguments 
are considered and we finish with some 
proposals for dealing with the dangers to the 
Scottish Parliament posed by the Barnett 
formula. 
2. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN 
SCOTLAND AND THE 
BARNETT FORMULA 
Public expenditure in the UK can be split into 
two main categories, identifiable and non-
identifiable. Identifiable public expenditure is 
that which can be recognised as having been 
incurred on behalf of a particular population, 
while non-identifiable is that which is deemed 
to be incurred on behalf of the UK as a whole 
(such as defence expenditure). The Treasury 
produces territorial analyses of identifiable 
public expenditure for each of the four home 
countries in the Public Expenditure: Statistical 
Analyses series. In turn, identifiable public 
expenditure in the case of Scotland can be 
allocated into two major categories, 
expenditure which remains the responsibility 
of Whitehall Departments (mainly social 
security) and that which falls within me 
responsibility of the Secretary of State for 
Scotland (such as health, education, and 
transport). The later category can be also be 
split into two categories, the so-called 
"Scottish Block" which accounts for about 
96%, the remainder being "agriculture, 
fisheries and food" and spending on 
nationalised industries1. 
The total for programmes supported by the 
Scottish Block is found by application of the 
Barnett formula to comparable public spending 
programmes in England (or England and 
Wales in certain cases). The government has 
also announced that the Block and Barnett 
formula conventions will be adopted to decide 
the setdements for programmes that fall under 
the responsibility of the Scottish parliament. 
This paper will be concerned with the 
implications of the Barnett formula for public 
spending in Scotland and the working of the 
Scottish Parliament. 
The Secretary of State for Scotland 
commented in December 1997 that, "In the 
past the Block and formula arrangements have 
been shrouded in mystery for most people and 
that has undoubtedly contributed to a 
misunderstanding of their purpose and 
effect"(Scottish Office, 1997b). As we shall 
see in this paper, this has certainly been the 
case. There is widespread misunderstanding of 
the nature of the Bamett formula and its 
implications for Scotland. However, the 
principle underlying the Bamett formula is 
extremely simple, it is the actual calculation 
and operation of the funding arrangements for 
Scotland where we encounter problems of 
confusion and lack of transparency. Before we 
look at the latter set of issues, it may help to 
consider the implications of the Bamett 
principle. 
The Barnett formula2 is named after the then 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury (Joel Bamett) 
and was introduced in 1978. It is intended to 
deliver to Scotland "a population-based share 
of changes of in planned spending on 
analogous programmes in England managed 
by the (Secretary) of State for Scotland" 
(Treasury Committee, 1997)3. So if there is a 
cash increase (or decrease) in spending in an 
English programme, then the application of 
Barnett would mean that the Scottish budget is 
adjusted up (or down) by a corresponding 
amount, adjusted for Scotland's population 
share relative to England. If government 
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spending per head goes up by £4 per head in 
England, the Barnett principle implies the 
Scottish budget (or Block) will be adjusted by 
£4 a head in Scotland as well. The principle 
could hardly be simpler, it is a straight one or 
one - for every pound increase in English 
government programmes corresponding to 
those in the Scottish Block, there will be a 
pound increase in Scottish government 
programmes, on a per capita basis. Once the 
total for the Block is calculated, the Secretary 
of State has discretion to allocate funds to 
Departments and programmes within the Block 
according to perceived Scottish needs and 
priorities. However, the Treasury Committee 
(1997) noted that since much public 
expenditure is continuing or demand-led, the 
scope for the exercise of this discretion is 
limited in practice. 
The mechanism is devised to maintain the 
same absolute increase in public spending per 
head in both Scotland and England. However, 
the absolute levels of public spending per head 
of population is higher in the programmes 
supported by the Scottish Block than in the 
corresponding English programmes. About 
£132 is spent per head on the Scottish Block 
for every £100 spent per head in comparable 
English programmes4. 
If Scottish public spending was to grow at the 
same rate as for corresponding English 
programmes, then spending on programmes in 
the Scottish Block should be increased by 32% 
more in Scodand compared to the rest. 
However, the Barnett formula restricts the 
Scottish increase to the same absolute increase 
as for corresponding English programmes. 
This means that in percentage terms the 
increase for Scots is worth less than in England 
and Wales. For example, if public spending is 
increased by 4% in England and Wales, the 
higher base for Scottish public spending levels 
means that Baraett translates this into a 
percentage increase in Scottish spending of 
about 3%. 
In itself this might not seem too bad an 
outcome for Scotland. After all, a 3% increase 
compared to a 4% increase may seem 
tolerable, especially in the context of pressure 
for a more dramatic redistribution of 
Scotland's public spending budget to other 
parts of the UK. 
However, there are two problems with this 
situation. The first is inflation. Typically most 
public spending increases are to cope with the 
effects of rising prices. Suppose public 
spending is increased in England by 4% to deal 
with an inflation rate of 4%. The increase in 
public spending down south would just 
compensate for the effects of rising prices, but 
Barnett would convert the English settlement 
into a real decline of 1% in the Scottish Block 
The problem is that it is margins like these that 
represent the battleground for 
improving/maintaining services, and for 
paying public sector wage increases. Once 
basic services are provided, it reduces the 
scope for pay increases. That wise 
Englishman Mr Micawber was well aware of 
the importance of margins in the context of 
human happiness; in this context we could say 
that public sector settlements above the level 
of inflation increases the chances of public 
sector happiness, while public sector 
settlements below the level of inflation are 
likely to increase the chances of public sector 
misery5. The Barnett formula means that 
Scodand is more likely to be miserable, and 
more often, about public expenditure 
settlements than is England. This clearly has 
political as well as economic implications. 
The second particular problem is time. The 
difference between, say, a 3% and a 4% 
increase may be tolerable as a one-off, but the 
Barnett formula implies a continuing squeeze 
on Scots public spending, or at least for as long 
as it takes for policy to change. Its precise 
impact on a yearly basis will depend on actual 
levels of cash public spending increases and 
the effects of inflation. However, it means that 
Scottish public spending increases more slowly 
relative to England and Wales over time, and is 
more quickly overtaken by inflation. In real 
terms, Scottish levels of public expenditure per 
head of population will be pulled inexorably 
towards convergence with the levels set down 
south as a consequence of what Cuthbert 
(1998) has described as "the Barnett squeeze". 
It is generally recognised that Scotland has 
needs for higher levels of public spending per 
head of population for reasons that include 
population density, health, climate and levels 
of public housing (Treasury Committee, 1998). 
However, "the Barnett formula does not 
directly reflect public expenditure 'need'" 
(Twigger, 1998). In fact, rather than 
sustaining higher levels of public spending in 
Scotland relative to England, Barnett is 
designed to erode differentials and lead to the 
eventual convergence of Scottish spending 
levels with those in prevailing in England. 
These properties of the Bamett Formula are 
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quite different from the popular perception of 
its nature and purpose, but they are in fact well 
recognised features, acknowledged and studied 
by academics and policy-makers alike. A 
recent Note by the Treasury to the Select 
Committee on the Treasury6 stated that, subject 
to certain influences, "the application of the 
formula will tend to lead over time to 
convergence of spending relativities between 
the countries of the Union on the programmes 
contained within the Block budgets". They 
note that a number of factors may influence the 
rate of convergence in practice, including the 
level of cash increases in comparable English 
programmes and changes in population 
relativities. 
As Bell et al (1996, p. 29)
 n0te, "The way in 
which the Bamett formula currently operates 
will eventually lead to equal per capita 
expenditure in the territories (though... the rate 
of convergence can be slow). This is not 
necessarily appropriate since it takes no 
account of variations in need across different 
parts of the country, nor in differences in the 
cost of delivery of services," 
This also raises the question of ascertaining 
what pattern of public spending would be 
needed to reflect Scotland's needs. The last 
official assessment of needs was conducted in 
the late-Seventies in the context of plans for 
devolution, and looked at the six main services 
to be devolved (broadly corresponding to the 
Scottish Block); it concluded that per capita 
funding in Scotland would have to be about 
16% higher in Scotland to provide comparable 
service levels. But in his evidence to the 
Treasury Select Committee investigation into 
the Bamett formula, "Professor Midwinter7 
was not persuaded of the value of another 
needs assessment. He noted that needs 
assessment are imprecise, leaving political 
acceptability more important than technical 
feasibility, and that, secondly, 'the (earlier) 
Treasury study Was far from foolproof, and 
arguments can be and were made over the 
weighting of factors in the report'" (Treasury 
Committee, 1997). As far as the degree to 
which Scotland has higher needs for public 
spending, Midwinter argued that "the extent 
of this higher needs ... has never been 
established wiw precision because precision in 
needs assessment js impossible" (Treasury 
Committee, 1997). 
The Bamett formula has been in operation 
since 1978 and it has had two decades of 
application to the Scottish public spending. We 
should therefore expect to see the moves 
towards convergence visible in the patterns of 
public spending now. However, there is no 
evidence of the kind of moves towards 
convergence on the scale implied by the 
formula. In the Note referred to above 
(Treasury Committee, 1998), the Treasury 
looked at trends in identifiable government 
spending per head in the different countries of 
the Union as published in successive issues of 
Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses. They 
found that spending per head in England as 
share of the UK average remained relatively 
stable over the period 1985-86 to 1995-96, 
while the corresponding measure for Scotland 
declined from 21% above the UK average to 
19% over the same period. A decline certainly, 
but a relatively modest one. 
Part of the reason for these results may lie in 
the fact that the published figures for 
identifiable government spending by country 
include spending on programmes outside the 
Block, notably Social Security spending. For 
example, the latest figures for identifiable 
government expenditure in Scotland in 1996-
97 is £24.75 bill8 while the part to which the 
Bamett formula applied - the Scottish Block -
was only £13.98 bill for that yea?. Social 
Security spending in Scotland in 1996-97 was 
£9.14 bill, but was only 9% above UK levels 
measured on a per capita basis. Non-Block 
elements such as Social Security may dampen 
the observed trend towards convergence and it 
is entirely possible - indeed likely - that the 
Block elements in identifiable public spending 
for Scotland could be declining faster than the 
other elements in this measure. 
However, there are other factors which may 
have slowed the actual rate of convergence of 
Scottish and English spending levels. These 
were analysed by Heald (1994) and he 
concluded that there were a number of factors 
that had led to the effects of the Barnett 
formula being muted or suppressed. He also 
concluded there was no sign of the predicted 
convergence of per capita block expenditure 
over the period 1979-80 to 1987-88. Heald 
notes that over the period 1976-92, Scotland's 
relative share of UK population had declined 
markedly, though the Treasury was still using 
the old population relativities in the Barnett 
calculations. This would have been to 
Scotland's benefit in terms of Block 
settlements. In addition, a number of other 
features led to what Heald describes as 
"formula bypass" and which could have 
affected the rate of convergence of Scottish to 
English spending levels. However, Heald 
notes that it was not possible to estimate the 
quantitative importance of formula bypass on 
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the basis of available published information. 
A separate analysis by Cuthbert (1998) 
summarises the major reasons for Barnett's 
"weak discipline" on Scottish public spending 
as (a) a tendency to uprate English and 
Scottish programmes by a common percentage 
(as opposed to absolute) increase in the early 
years of Bamett (b) Major public sector awards 
such as those to teachers and health service 
workers were funded in fall irrespective of 
Barnett (c) as noted above, the population ratio 
on which Bamett is based was not updated for 
a number of years, despite Scotland's 
population declining relative to England. 
It is not possible to evaluate on the basis of the 
published information to what extent formula 
bypass continued, but the reportedly sharper 
scrutiny to which the funding arrangements for 
Scotland were being subjected could have 
reduced the opportunities for casual formula 
bypass, and accelerated the trend towards 
convergence. McGregor et al also note (1997, 
p. 73, "the (population) weights of the formula 
were changed for the first time in 1992 and 
now reflect current population share and 
should promote faster convergence". The 
government has now decided to update the 
population figures from 1999-2000, and 
annually after that. More generally Cuthbert 
(1998) concludes that sources of bypass 
identified by him have been effectively 
plugged by the Treasury in the early Nineties 
and that "the Barnett formula now has teeth, in 
a way that it did not have originally ... it is 
already delivering, and will continue to 
deliver, a squeeze on Scottish public 
expenditure " (Cuthbert, 1998, p.3). 
Interestingly, the Treasury has published two 
separate estimates of the ratio of the Scottish 
Block to corresponding English programmes in 
recent years. In the first case10, "Excluding 
expenditure within the Scottish block which 
has no English equivalent, the Treasury has 
calculated the per capita block relative for 
Scotland in 1993-94 to be 138 (England = 100) 
(Heald, 1994, p. 172). In the second case, the 
Treasury again estimated the relative size of 
the Scottish Block relative to comparable 
English spending programmes on a per capita 
basis, this time for 1995-96. It was concluded 
that, "the analysis suggests that in 1995-96, for 
Scottish Block spending of about £13.7billion 
or £2670 per head, equivalent spending in 
England was around £98.7 billion or 2020 per 
head" (Treasury Committee, 1998). If we 
again take me English figure for government 
spending per head in 1995-96 as a base of 100, 
then the Scottish Block per capita relative is 
now 132. These estimates suggest that on a per 
capita basis, the Scottish Block fell from being 
38% higher than its English equivalent in 
1993-94, to just 32% higher in 1995-96. 
These figures have to be treated with caution 
since the ratio may be affected by factors other 
than Barnett, for example, adjustments to the 
composition of the Blocks from one year to the 
next. Some of the complicating factors are 
discussed in the Treasury Note. Further, it is 
not clear whether the Treasury used the same 
methodology and set of assumptions to 
construct the corresponding or implied English 
Block in both cases11. Nevertheless, the change 
in the ratio is certainly in the right direction if 
we expected to see convergence at last being 
set into train by the changes of the early 
Nineties. 
At this point we can take stock of the 
implications of adopting the Barnett formula 
under devolution. The White Paper on the 
Scottish Parliament is quite clear on its 
advantages. 
"In practice (the) arrangements based on 
the (Scottish) Block and (Barnett) formula 
have produced fair settlements for Scotland 
in annual public expenditure rounds and 
have allowed the Secretary of State for 
Scotland to determine his spending 
decisions in accordance with Scottish needs 
and priorities. They have largely removed 
the need for annual negotiation between 
The Scottish Office and the Treasury. The 
government have therefore concluded that 
the financial framework for the Scottish 
Parliament should be based on these 
arrangements with, in future, the Scottish 
Parliament detennining Scottish spending 
priorities" (Scottish Office, 1997a, p. 22). 
But if Scotland has been delivered fair 
settlements in public spending rounds over the 
years, it is precisely because these settlements 
have been produced despite the formula, not 
because of it. Had the formula actually been 
effective and operated as it was designed to do, 
Scottish public spending would now be at 
significantly lower levels and would be well on 
the way towards convergence with English 
levels. It is therefore ironic that it should be 
commended and adopted for devolution in the 
context of its having to fail to work as 
intended, especially since the changes of the 
early Nineties suggest that this failure may be 
a thing of the past. It is rather like 
commending guns for being safe on the basis 
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that they have only fired blanks in the past, just 
as they are being loaded with live ammunition. 
In the next section we shall consider the 
implications of the Bamett formula for 
Scottish devolution. 
3. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF 
THE BARNETT FORMULA 
The difficulties of establishing whether there 
has been a move towards convergence of 
Scottish and English levels of public spending 
are compounded by the absence of published 
information on the level of the corresponding 
English programmes (or "English Block") 
relating to the programmes comprising the 
Scottish Block; "(The Barnett) formula 
allocates to Scotland a population weighted 
share of the changes in an unknown block of 
English and Welsh spending programmes" 
(McGregor et al, 1997, p. 73, italics added): 
"Although the Scottish and Welsh Blocks are 
published information (their) English 
equivalents have never been published". 
(Heald, 1994, p. 148: italics in original). This 
means that researchers have not had an 
accurate picture of the relative magnitudes of 
the Scottish and (implied) English Blocks and 
so have not been able to infer issues such as 
the extent of convergence in the course of a 
year, and rate of convergence over time. 
One solution is to adopt a bottom-up approach 
by identifying English Departments which 
have correlates within the Scottish Block and 
aggregating government spending on them to 
obtain a measure for the English Block. This 
approach can be followed up to a point since 
there are Westminster departments (such as 
Health) which clearly have counterparts within 
the Scottish Block just as there are departments 
(such as Social Security) which fall outside it. 
However, there are also departments, some of 
whose spending is English level (and which 
would have a corresponding element in the 
Scottish Block) and some of which is UK level 
and so outside Block calculations. So beyond 
a point any bottom-up calculations of the 
inferred English block are subject to 
guesswork12. 
However, in March 1998 the Treasury 
provided an actual estimate of the English 
Block in response to a request from the 
Treasury Select Committee. As noted above, 
they estimated it as £98.7 billion for 1995-96. 
This offers up the possibility of an alternative 
top-down approach to estimating the possible 
implications of the application of the Bamett 
formula. For 1995-96 we now have figures for 
the Scottish Block and the corresponding 
"English Block". We know what the cash 
increase in the Scottish Block is for 1996-97 
from 1995-96 from the published figures. This 
increase is calculated from the programmes 
constituting die corresponding English Block 
by applying the Barnett or Portillo factor13 
(.1066 for that year) to those figures. This 
means that we should be able to reverse the 
process and obtain a figure for the increase in 
the English Block from 1995-96 to 1996-97 by 
dividing the corresponding cash increase in the 
Scottish Block by the Bamett or Portillo factor. 
If we add the resulting figure to the English 
Block estimate for 1995-96, this gives us an 
estimate for the English Block for 1996-97. 
We can repeat this process to derive estimates 
for the English Block for 1997-98, and so on 
for years afterwards, including planned 
expenditure over the period of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review, 1999-2002. 
Having derived a series for both the Scottish 
Block and the implied English Block in cash 
terms from 1995-96 to 2011-2002, we can 
calculate growth rates of the respective Blocks 
both in cash and real terms over the period. 
The method of calculating these figures and 
the results are discussed in the Appendix. The 
resulting growth rates of the Scottish Block 
and die implied English Block are shown in 
Charts 1 and 2, in turn derived from Tables 5 
and 6 respectively in the Appendix. 
How reliable are the various estimates 
produced by this exercise? We can rephrase 
this question in two ways. If we were to ask 
how accurate the estimates of the English 
Block are, it is subject to a variety of 
qualifications and these are discussed further 
in die Appendix. There is inevitably a degree 
of imprecision in the estimates, some of which 
reflects future uncertainty and some which 
may reflect elements extraneous to the Bamett 
formula affecting the outcome of the Block 
settlement. So the answer here is that there is 
inevitably a degree of imprecision in estimates 
produced by this process. 
If we were to ask instead whether the exercise 
produces estimates of comparative growth diat 
are indicative of the likely comparative growth 
levels of die respective Blocks, then we have 
more reason for confidence in the general 
conclusions we draw from this exercise. Since 
both die changes to the English Block and the 
English Block itself (here EDEL from 1999-
2000)14 are found by assuming that the 
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Scottish Block has been derived by a straight 
application of the Barnett formula, the critical 
issue is whether and to what extent there has 
been - or is planned to be - a bypass of the 
formula in calculating the Scottish Block. 
However, many of the sources of bypass in the 
past identified by Heald (1994) were 
anomalies or temporary situations and these 
sources have since been generally plugged up. 
Also, significant bypass would contradict the 
stated intention of the government to make 
Bamett the dominant force in this area. It 
would seem reasonable to conclude, in the 
absence of information to the contrary, that 
Barnett has been fairly consistently applied to 
the totals for the Scottish Block (and its 
successor, post-1998-99) and that Charts 1 and 
2 are reasonably indicative of the comparative 
growth (actual and/or estimated and/or 
planned) of the respective Blocks and their 
successors over the period in question. 
The Charts give some interesting results for the 
implied effects of the formula. As can be seen 
from Table 5 and Chart 1, there was little in 
the way of an implied Bamett squeeze on 
Scottish public spending relative to English 
public spending in the three years to 1998-99, 
for the simple reason there was little in the way 
of cash increases in public spending north or 
south of the border. There was however a real 
squeeze on Scottish public spending over the 
three year period of about 2.2% a year as Chart 
2 indicates, a pain that was almost equally 
shared south of the border (implied real fall in 
corresponding English spending levels of 
about 2.1% a year). 
The situation looks very different for the three 
years covered by the Comprehensive Spending 
Review, 1999-2002. There are significant cash 
increases in public spending planned for all 
parts of the UK over the period and Charts 1 
and 2 show the estimated growth rates for both 
Scotland and England in cash and real terms 
respectively. As can be seen in Table 5, the 
successor to the Scottish Block (here the 
SDEL) is expected to grow at about 4.8% a 
year in cash terms, while the Barnett 
conversion suggests that the corresponding 
English programmes will grow by an average 
of 6.3% over the period. Here we expect this to 
correspond to a 2.2% real increase (Scotland) 
and a 3.7% real increase (England). No real 
squeeze any more in England or Scotland, but 
the figures imply a strong Bamett squeeze with 
growth in Scottish public spending falling 
about 1.5 percentage points less than growth in 
corresponding public spending programmes in 
England, or a little over 4.5% in total over the 
three year period of the Comprehensive 
Spending Review. 
This implies a major change in Scotland's 
relative share of public spending in these areas 
over a very short period. It would be possible 
to get at least a partial cross-check on these 
figures by doing a bottom-up analysis of how 
the major components of the spending 
programmes under the control of the Secretary 
of State/Scottish Parliament are planned to 
change compared to those in England over the 
period. One analysis along these lines has 
been provided by Midwinter and McVicar15. 
They found that over the three years of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review, government 
health spending in Scotland was planned to 
increase by 10% (compared to 25% in 
England), the corresponding figure for housing 
expenditure was a rise of 22% in Scotland 
(49% in England), while education spending 
was programmed to rise by 15% in Scotland 
(19% in England). 
These are three major programme areas within 
the Scottish Block and are also the three 
priority areas identified by the Secretary of 
State for Scotland16. In these cases, the actual 
planned drift between percentage increases in 
Scottish and that of corresponding English 
programmes is actually greater than would be 
expected from a straight application of the 
Barnett formula. The important message from 
this bottom-up approach is that there is no 
evidence that our method is exaggerating the 
extent of the Bamett squeeze, if anything it 
suggests we may be underestimating the effect 
of the squeeze, certainly as far as major 
components of Scottish public spending is 
concerned. 
We can draw some general conclusions from 
this overview of the effects of Barnett over the 
course of three lean years and three fat years 
(seen in public spending terms). The irony is 
that when Bamett formula leads to significant 
redistribution (the Barnett squeeze), it is at 
times when its effects may be overlooked by 
the relatively high cash settlements in Scottish 
public spending (here 1999-2002). When both 
sides of the border are suffering real squeezes 
on public spending (here 1996-99) the pain is 
shared almost equally on both sides of the 
border and there is little in the way of a Barnett 
squeeze. 
There is no typical year in the analysis above 
since the two periods of three years each fall 
into two distinctive categories of low and high 
cash increases. But we can work out the 
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average increases in public spending per year 
north and south of the border. Scotland will 
just about break even in terms of an average 
real increase in public spending of about 0% a 
year over the six year period, while the 
corresponding programmes in England will 
have received a real increase of about 0.8% a 
year. The squeeze on Scottish public spending 
programmes relative to English is almost 5% 
over six years 
In the next section we shall draw some 
conclusion this analysis may have for die 
implications of the Bamett formula, the Tartan 
Tax, and the question of whether Scotland is 
oversubsidised relative to the rest of the UK. 
4. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
OF "THE BARNETT SQUEEZE" 
In this section we shall draw some conclusions 
about the implications of the Barnett formula. 
The formula itself can be questioned from the 
perspectives of arbitrariness and fairness. The 
"Tartan Tax" can be questioned from the 
perspectives of its potential effectiveness and 
the reasonableness of its objectives. Finally it 
will be suggested that the issue of whether or 
not Scotland is over-subsidised really misses 
the point, since in practice it is not a question 
of whether public spending should be 
redistributed from Scotland to other parts of 
the UK, but when this will occur. We shall 
take each of these issues in turn. 
One of the most striking characteristics of the 
Bamett Formula is its arbitrariness. Suppose 
the government has a policy of keeping public 
spending increases in line with inflation. In 
the absence of inflation mere are no cash 
increases in English programmes and Bamett 
means that the same holds for corresponding 
Scottish programmes. Public spending is 
maintained at the same real level in both 
England Scotland. Now suppose inflation is 
4% a year, English public spending rises by 
4% a year to cope with its effects, Bamett 
converts the increase in corresponding Scottish 
into 3% and so Scottish public spending in 
these programmes declines by 1% a year in 
real terms. Whether or not Scottish public 
spending keeps pace with English spending or 
falls behind it in these cases has little to do 
with rational policy decisions but is dependent 
on the rate of inflation. 
The White Paper on Scotland's Parliament 
(Scottish Office, 1997a) argues that Barnett 
has produced "fair settlements for Scotland in 
annual public expenditure rounds" (p. 22). But 
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if it is fair this has been a matter of accident 
rather than design, and this is likely to be a 
temporary rather uian a structural feature of the 
system. Let us suppose that Bamett has 
delivered a "fair" settlement for Scotland in 
1998-99. Our analysis above suggests that the 
Scottish Parliament will lose about 4.6% of its 
funding for programmes under its control 
relative to comparable English programmes 
over the next three years, compared to what the 
increase would have been had the Scottish 
programmes received the same percentage 
increase. It is hard to see what changes in 
Scottish public spending could justify such a 
reallocation of funding and, as far as is known, 
there has been no attempt to justify such a 
switch by the Government or its agencies17. If 
Scotland's settlement was fair in 1998-99, it is 
unlikely to be fair in just a few years time. 
As far as the Tartan Tax is concerned, doubts 
must be expressed about its potential 
effectiveness as a source of discretionary 
income for the Scottish Parliament. The 
Constitutional Convention was instrumental in 
framing die major parameters under which the 
Parliament will operate and it argued in its 
Report that: 
"The power to vary the rate of tax is 
vital if the Parliament is to be properly 
accountable. Critics of the proposal to 
establish a Parliament in Scotland 
repeatedly state that such a power is 
essential for an effective Parliament 
Scotland's Parliament will have the 
power to increase or cut the basic rate 
of income tax for Scottish taxpayers by 
a maximum of 3p in the pound. This 
will give it a greater degree of 
independence" (p. 27) 
The document goes on to argue: 
'Tough decisions will have to be made, 
but these will be the decisions of the 
people of Scotland, made by their 
elected representatives. There will be 
hard decisions but they will be our 
decisions 
For example, if Scotland's elected 
representatives wanted a different level 
of investment for education, health or 
other services, they would either have 
to find savings from existing budgets or 
raise the necessary revenues and answer 
for their actions at the ballot box." (p. 
28) 
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The problem with these statements is that 
they are not based on an accurate 
understanding of the potential effectiveness 
of the 'Tartan Tax". This can be seen under 
alternative regimes; for example, we have a 
real squeeze on Scottish public spending 
over the three years 1995-99, and a planned 
Bamett squeeze on Scottish public spending 
over the 1999-2002 period. Let us lay aside 
any grand ideas of the Tartan Tax actually 
enhancing public spending levels; how 
effective could it be in the more modest task 
of just compensating for either of these 
squeezes, real or Bamett-driven? 
It would be not at all effective. The White 
Paper (Scottish Office, 1997a) calculates that 
if the Parliament used its discretionary 
powers to the full and added 3p on income 
tax, it could raise about £450million in extra 
income. So, suppose the Scottish Parliament 
had already been in operation during the late-
Nineties and had tried to use its discretionary 
powers to stem the erosion of public 
spending in Scotland. Since the Parliament 
will inherit the Bamett formula, and a 
modified version of the Scottish Block, this 
may be seen as a reasonable first test of its 
powers. What would have been the result? 
Table 2 in the Appendix helps suggest the 
answer. In just one year, from 1995-96 to 
1996-97, the Scottish Block declined by 
£409million in real terms. After that it 
continued to decline by a further £220million 
and £300million respectively in the 
subsequent two years. The Parliament could 
have stemmed the real decline in Scottish 
public spending levels, but for only little 
more than a year; 3p on the basic rate (and 
£450 million revenue) would have 
compensated for the loss of the £409million 
in 96-97, but not by much. After that, the 
real squeeze on spending would have begun 
to bite in 1997-98 and 1998-99 with the 
Parliament all but powerless to use tax 
raising powers to deal with it. A years 
decline in real public spending would have 
been staved off on a one-off basis - but at the 
expense of Scottish income tax rates now 
having a built-in 3p in the pound 
disadvantage relative to the rest of the UK. 
Alternatively, could the discretionary tax 
raising powers be effective in staving off a 
Bamett squeeze? Again, not really. If 
Scottish public spending was to overcome 
the Bamett squeeze and grow at the same 
rate as comparable English programmes over 
the next three years, Table 5 indicates that it 
would have to grow by about an extra 1.5% a 
year, which means that every year over the 
period the extra revenue to be found ratchets 
up by an average of about an extra 
£200million. The Parliament would be able 
to use its tax raising powers to find the extra 
cash required to stave off the Bamett squeeze 
for little over half the lifetime of the 
Parliament. After that, the Bamett squeeze 
overcomes the ability of the Parliament to 
compensate for it, and Scottish public 
spending again begins to grow at a slower 
rate than that for corresponding English 
programmes. Again, the Parliament will 
have had just one shot at using its 
discretionary tax raising powers, could have 
been effective at staving off another squeeze 
on spending (this time a Bamett squeeze) for 
only a few months, and again finds that the 
price of a temporary respite is permanently 
(or indefinitely) high tax rates relative to the 
rest of the UK. This is not an effective tool. 
As a cross check, it should be noted that 
these conclusions are broadly consistent with 
those of Cuthbert and Cuthbert (1998, pp. 
16-17). They calculated that if Westminster 
was setting public expenditure increases in 
England simply to compensate for a 3% 
inflation rate, then the Parliament could 
would only be able to stave off real cuts in 
spending by using its discretionary tax 
raising powers for about 4-5 years. 
But perhaps more dangerous than the reality 
of ineffectiveness is the illusion of 
effectiveness, and the implications for the 
reasonableness of its objectives. The White 
Paper on the Scottish Parliament explicitly 
designed the tax to be consistent with the 
recommendations of the Convention 
(Scottish Office, 1997a, p. 23). But the 
vision behind the framing of the tax by the 
Constitutional Convention as detailed above 
is severely flawed since it talks of the tax 
encouraging "accountability", and "a degree 
of independence" and "hard decisions...but 
our decisions". This completely fails to 
recognise that any decision that the 
Parliament may make about raising revenues 
is liable to be quickly overtaken by events 
and indeed swamped by the Barnett squeeze. 
Put in the wider context of the Barnett-
controlled drive towards convergence of 
public spending levels between Scotland and 
England, the tax is an irrelevance. But it is 
potentially more dangerous than that because 
it may give the illusion of discretion and 
power where none really exists. This may 
lead to false expectations as to what the 
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Parliament is or should be capable of, and 
may engender cynicism and disenchantment 
when it fails to deliver. 
Finally, there is the issue of whether or not 
Scotland is oversubsidised at the expense of 
the rest of the UK. This question is really 
beyond the scope of our paper but we can 
note that the debate here tends to consistently 
miss the important point, which is that the 
Bamett mechanism is a device for levelling 
per capita public spending in that of Scotland 
to that of England, irrespective of whether or 
not such levelling is warranted or not On 
current trends we would estimate that the 
Bamett squeeze will result in funds for 
programmes under the control of the 
Parliament being about 6% lower over the 
course of a four year Parliament than it 
would have been had Scotland been given 
the same proportionate increase in public 
spending as England. This is equivalent to 
lopping off about Slbill a year in Scottish 
public spending by the end of the 
Parliament's term. Those who would argue 
for a reduction in Scotland's share of public 
spending do not have to win their arguments, 
or even have to make them. They just have 
to wait. It is programmed to happen anyway, 
and on a continuing basis. 
S. CONCLUSIONS 
We have argued that the Barnett formula is 
arbitrary in its effects and that if it does lead 
to a fair distribution of public spending for 
Scotland relative to England in any one 
period, this is likely to be a temporary 
arrangement which will quickly be overtaken 
by the Barnett squeeze. It is likely to 
institutionalise conflict between the Scottish 
and Westminster Parliaments as its effects on 
spending relatives are perceived or felt in 
Scotland. The Tartan Tax would be an 
ineffective device as far as obtaining 
discretionary funds for the Scottish 
Parliament in the face of either a real squeeze 
or a Barnett squeeze on public spending. It 
is worse than ineffective because it may give 
the dangerous illusion of responsibility and 
effective control where they do not really 
exist. The question of whether or not 
Scotland is oversubsidised relative to 
England really misses the point that the 
Barnett formula programmes Scotland to 
converge on English public spending levels 
anyway. It is not a question of whether 
Scottish public spending should be reduced 
relative to English ones, but by how much 
and how quickly. 
There is a further point that seems to have 
escaped the attention of the policy-makers; 
the Barnett formula will have to be 
abandoned sooner or later. Now that it is 
working effectively it can only be a stop-gap 
measure. As Heald (1994) noted "the 
Scottish Office has received an assurance 
that the operation of the Barnett formula will 
not lead to a reduction in Scotland's public 
expenditure below that justified on the basis 
of relative need" (p. 172). Suppose somehow 
that that point could be established when the 
Scottish public spending levels have been 
reduced to a certain level above English 
public spending levels. There would be little 
point in deciding that this was the 
appropriate floor to which Scottish public 
spending levels relative to England should be 
allowed to decline - and then allowing the 
Barnett formula to continue to be applied to 
further erode Scottish public spending levels 
down towards English levels. There is no 
notion of a floor to spending relatives in the 
operation of the Bamett formula. If at some 
point it was decided that enough was enough, 
then Bamett would have to be abandoned or 
some means found to counteract its effects. 
Further, as Heald (1994, p. 172) suggests, at 
some point the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, or successor, may have to make a 
political judgement to call for a needs 
assessment study to redetermine the case for 
additional funds for Scotland. However as 
noted earlier precision in needs assessment is 
impossible. We can see this in the context of 
one spending area, education. Does Scotland 
need so many small rural Primary schools? 
Probably yes, if you value the contribution 
these can make to a community; possibly no, 
if you tend to emphasise economies of scale 
from concentrated schooling in the urbanised 
South. Should Scotland be spending so much 
on Secondary schooling compared to 
England? Probably yes, if you value 
children of all classes being educated 
together and being given equal access to 
education; possibly no, if you value parental 
choice and a greater role for the private 
sector in secondary education. Does 
Scotland need a four year Honours degrees? 
Probably yes, if you value the broad based 
tradition of Scotland's education system, and 
the role of the 4-year degree as a standard 
commodity in most countries of the world. 
Possibly no, if you would emphasise parity 
with the rest of the UK. 
There is no such thing as a standard needs 
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assessment when it comes to cultural values 
and traditions. Any attempt to impose a UK 
template in these areas would be dominated 
by the perceptions of those who draw up the 
assessment, and would probably result in the 
harmonisation and homogenisation of 
perceived standards to those prevailing south 
of the border, to the detriment of the Scottish 
case. 
It could be argued mat it is one thing to 
criticise, but are there any solutions to the 
dismal scenarios implied in this paper? We 
can suggest a couple of improvements over 
the existing situation. Firstly, in line with the 
new emphasis in transparency, the figures for 
the corresponding "English Block" should be 
published. Since these figures must have 
been identified in the first place (albeit in 
disaggregated form) in order for the 
appropriate figure for the "Scottish Block" to 
be derived, it should be a simple matter to 
collect them together and publish them as the 
"parent" block figure from which the "child" 
Scottish Block is derived. This would help 
confirm the extent to which there is, or is not, 
a Barnett squeeze on Scottish public 
spending. Admittedly this could cause 
political problems for the government since 
evidence of Barnett squeeze could be held 
against it north of the border, while any 
attempts to bypass the formula could show 
up in the figures and be held against it south 
of the border. However, it would certainly 
help to focus and enlighten the debate in a 
Scottish context. It is difficult to see how 
continuing not to produce these figures could 
be defended, especially when the Treasury 
has been able to produce estimates for the 
"English Block" for two years in response to 
questions from two government committees. 
The second recommendation would involve a 
simple amendment to the Barnett formula, 
Instead of forcing convergence to English 
levels of public spending by giving Scotland 
the same absolute increase in spending per 
head as in England, this could be 
reformulated to give Scotland the same 
percentage increase per head as in England. 
This would at least broadly preserve the 
existing distribution of public spending on a 
share of population basis and recognise 
Scotland's needs for a structurally and 
permanently higher level of public spending 
compared to the UK. This would halt the 
trend of Scotland's public spending levels 
converging inexorably towards levels set by 
English needs and give the Scottish 
Parliament a chance to operate in a financial 
environment where it is not permanently 
disadvantaged compared to its bigger sister 
down south. 
The advantages of this amendment can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Automaticity of settlements, which means 
that it retains a crucial advantage of Barnett 
in that it removes the need to bargain and 
argue over annual settlements. 
2. It is simple. It could be simply grafted on to 
the existing proposed arrangement for 
calculating the Departmental Expenditure 
Limit for the Scottish Parliament on a 
population-weighted basis, the only change 
being that the programme figures for 
Scotland are calculated to give the same 
percentage increase per capita as in 
England, rather than the same cash increase 
per capita. Further, the Bamett formula is 
(and is intended to be) a non-statutory 
administrative arrangement. It is not 
prescribed in legislation so it should be 
relatively straightforward to make changes 
to it. 
3. This solution recognises and maintains a 
higher level of public spending per capita 
for Scotland relative to England. The 
Barnett formula does not do this. 
4. It actually formalises and institutionalises 
what is commonly believed to be the 
funding arrangement that exists at the 
moment. The conventional wisdom is that 
Barnett was intended to preserve funding 
relativities between England and Scotland. 
This is not surprising since the suggested 
reformulation actually reflects more closely 
the way the Scottish Block was calculated 
over most of the period of its existence than 
does the Bamett principle. If, as the 
government has suggested, the existing 
arrangements have delivered fair 
settlements to Scotland for the last couple 
of decades, then this reformulation helps to 
re-affirm, perpetuate and institutionalise 
this arrangement. 
5. It may be politically attractive since it 
solves the Micawber problem of the 
margins discussed earlier; that is it removes 
the built-in tendency of the Barnett formula 
to deliver higher public expenditure 
percentage increases in England compared 
to Scotland, settlements which may turn 
out to be acceptable in England but not in 
Scotland. In the case of Charts 1 and 2, this 
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means mat the bar for Scottish public 
spending for Scotland in any given year 
would be comparable to the corresponding 
bar for England. Such parity should reduce 
the chances of a confrontation between 
Holyrood and Westminster along budgetary 
lines. 
6. This solution may actually help create a 
niche for the so-called 'Tartan Tax". As we 
noted before, the sums involved in the 
discretionary tax raising powers for the 
parliament are small and cannot cope with 
real or Barnett squeezes. However, the 
solution proposed here eliminates the 
Barnett squeeze. If, then, public spending 
increases in England are designed to cope 
with the effects of inflation, then there may 
be some scope for the tax to deliver 
something extra at the margin in Scotland, 
and as we have noted it is the margin which 
can make the difference between 
satisfactory and unsatisfactory outcomes at 
this level. 
7. It is cheap solution seen from a UK 
perspective. 
This would be essentially a pragmatic solution 
to the problems posed by the Bamett formula. 
It does not claim that the existing relative 
levels of spending in England and Scotland are 
necessarily appropriate, but as others have 
noted mere are no precise instruments for a 
proper needs assessment in this area anyway. 
In any case, it does not preclude the possibility 
of a reassessment of the spending relativities 
further down the line, though removing the 
pressure of the Barnett squeeze means that this 
could be done in a more controlled fashion, 
rather than crisis-induced by the convergence 
pressure of Barnett - and , as we noted above, 
Bamett will have to abandoned at some future 
date anyway. This solution would allow the 
Parliament to settle without having to cope 
with the added pressure of the Barnett squeeze. 
Would this solution be politically acceptable 
down south? To the extent that this is what 
most people apparently think happens anyway, 
it should not make much difference. It could 
be justified as just maintaining the current 
relativities, and simply preserving the current 
shares in public spending per head. Indeed, it 
can be pointed out that Scotland's declining 
population share (relative to England) would 
mean that its corresponding share of total 
public spending in these areas would still be 
programmed to go down, even with this 
reformulation. 
There are no ideal solutions in this area, it is 
matter of choosing between imperfect 
alternatives. However, the Barnett formula is a 
highly imperfect alternative. Now that it is 
working as originally intended, it will be like 
an ever tightening tourniquet around the areas 
of public spending that many Scots see as 
crucial to their quality of life. Unless this is 
recognised along with a willingness to 
consider alternatives such as the one suggested 
here, the prospects for the Holyrood 
Parliament are gloomy indeed. 
APPENDIX: ESTIMATING THE 
BARNETT SQUEEZE 
We begin with the cash figures (outturns and 
plans) for the Scottish Block and the Scottish 
Office Departmental Expenditure Limit18, 
1995-2002. 
The outturns and plans for the Scottish Block 
are also provided in real terms, 1995-2002. 
For the years 1995-99, the Bamett formula 
indicates that; 
AS = 0.1066 AE 
(Where S = Scottish Block and E = 
corresponding programmes in England) 
This means that changes in funding for the 
corresponding English programmes (the 
implied "English Block") can also be 
expressed as a function of changes in the 
Scottish Block; 
AE = 9.38AS 
Since we can work out AS for each year 96-99 
from Table 1, we can also now work 
backwards to estimate AE also. These 
measures are shown in Table 3. 
Since figures for "E", the corresponding 
"English Block" are not published, in general 
it has not been possible to accurately measure 
how cash and real changes in the Scottish 
Block for a given year compare to 
corresponding changes in the English figures. 
However, the recent Special Report by the 
Treasury Committee (1998) provides estimates 
of E for a single year 1995-96. In that year, 
the Treasury estimates that for spending on 
Scottish Block programmes of around £13.7 
billion or £2,670 per head, the "English 
equivalent" was around £98.7 billion or £2020 
a head. This means that in Table 4 we can now 
Volume 24, No.l, 1998 42 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 
fill in a 1995-96 entry for the corresponding 
"English Block" of £98,700 million. 
But since we have already estimated AE for 
each of the subsequent three years (Table 3) 
this means that we can now estimate E for each 
of these years also. The estimate for 1996-97 
is derived by adding AE = -19 to E for 1995-
96, and the process is repeated for each of the 
two subsequent years, 1997-98 and 1998-99. 
This gives us the range of estimates for the 
"English Block" over the period 1995-99 in 
Table 4. 
In principle, the process can also be repeated 
for the three years spanned by the 
Comprehensive Spending Review. We know 
what the planned Scottish Office Departmental 
Expenditure Limit (SDEL) is in each year 
(Table 1), and can estimate the cash increase in 
SDEL. Since this is the total to which the 
Bamett formula is to be applied, we should 
also be able to work backwards to estimate the 
cash changes in a constructed estimate of the 
corresponding English programmes (defined 
here as EDEL) and in turn work out an 
estimate of the cash size of the corresponding 
EDEL for each year over the period of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review. 
A complication is that the new SDEL does not 
precisely match the old Scottish Block, and as 
Table 1 indicates it is about 6.5% smaller than 
the old Scottish Block (1998-99 figures). The 
major change between the old Scottish Block 
and the new SDEL is the exclusion of non-
domestic rates from the calculation of SDEL19. 
We shall assume here that the switch from 
Scottish Block to SDEL has a neutral effect on 
the ratio of spending on Scottish programmes 
relative to spending on corresponding English 
programmes. This means that for 1998-99, we 
assume: 
S/E = 0.1386 = SDEL/EDEL 
Since we know planned SDEL for 1998-99, 
this allows us to derive a base estimate for 
EDEL for that year. We can now estimate 
AEDEL for each of the three years of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review by using the 
same technique that allowed us to construct an 
inferred English Block in Table 4. However, 
the Bamett or Portillo factor is to be changed 
in 1990-2000 to reflect changes in population 
and in that year it is intended: 
ASDEL = 0.1045 AEDEL 
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As noted earlier, it is also intended that the 
Bamett or Portillo factor be reviewed every 
year from 1999-2000 to reflect changes in 
population. For our purposes we shall assume 
mat SDEL in the three years 1999-2002 will be 
derived from EDEL by using the factor 0.1045. 
The results are shown in Table 4. 
We can now use these figures to estimate and 
compare the cash growth (Table 5) and real 
growth (Table 6) of Scottish and comparable 
English programmes under the Bamett 
formula. A 2.5% inflation rate was used to 
calculate expected real growth in SDEL and 
EDEL estimates over the period 1999-2002. 
This is the governments target rate of inflation 
and is also currently the Bank of England's 
central projection for the 18 month period 
beginning mid-1999 (Bank of England, 1998). 
The actual estimates of cash and real growth 
should be treated with some caution. There are 
a number of possible sources of error which 
include; 
(1) It should be remembered that all published 
figures relating to 1997-98 are estimated 
outturns while those for later years are plans. 
(2) We have also assumed that moving to 
SDEL from the Scottish Block has a neutral 
effect as far as the ratio of spending on Barnett 
influenced Scottish Programmes to comparable 
English programmes is concerned. To the 
extent that this switch actually raises (lowers) 
the ratio of spending on Scottish programmes 
to English programmes, the analysis above will 
overestimate (underestimate) the percentage 
change in the corresponding English EDEL. 
(3) There may also be changes to the SDEL 
made outside the Barnett calculation which 
will result in error in calculating the affect the 
level of EDEL if the Barnett formula is used 
without appropriate modification. 
(4) Some of the calculations performed to 
derive a budget for Scottish spending on a 
particular programme may relate to 
corresponding English and Welsh 
programmes, not English only, in which case a 
different factor may be used. 
(5) Further, there may be subsequent changes 
in the Barnett or Portillo factor (currently 
0.1066, shifting to 0.1045 in 1999-2000) to 
take into account changes in Scotland's 
relative share of population. 
Each of these may affect the accuracy of our 
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estimates. The first source of possible error is 
unavoidable and reflects future uncertainty. 
The second and third source of error may have 
a marginal effect on inferred growth rates but 
given mat we are talking about marginal 
adjustments to the old Scottish Block we 
would be surprised if this finished up having a 
major impact on implied EDEL growth rates. 
It is difficult to be sure about the fourth 
possible source of error except to note that the 
various ways in which Bamett was 
circumvented in the old Scottish Block in the 
past (Heald , 1997) appear to reflect the 
circumstances of these times. In the absence of 
further information to the contrary, it 
reasonable to assume that Bamett is now, and 
will be, the dominant driver behind the 
allocation of SDEL spending. Finally, the 
relatively slow rate at which the population of 
Scotland is declining relative to England20 
(Office of National Statistics, 1998) means that 
errors on forecasting the appropriate Barnett or 
Portillo factor is likely to be a minor source of 
error as far as calculating AEDEL is 
concerned. 
In short, while there are undoubtedly reasons 
for regarding the estimation and comparison of 
growth rates in Tables 5 and 6 with some 
caution, there are also reasonable grounds for 
believing that the growth estimates in Table 5 
and 6 are at least indicative of how Bamett has 
influenced, and will influence, the growth of 
public spending in Scotland relative to that of 
England. 
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Table 1 Scottish Block and Planned Scottish Departmental Expenditure Limits, 1995-2000, Cash 
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